Mersa Matruh and Minqar Qaim
In 1942, things came to a climactic head in North Africa, as the Afrika Korps and their Italian allies kept up their advance towards Egypt, seemingly unstoppable. After the disastrous battle of Galaza, General Ritchie and the 8th army retreated to the defensive position at Mersa Matruh 100 or so miles to the East, on the Egyptian border. The planned strategy was to use the defensive fortified positions there, linked by minefields, to hold off the Afrika Korps. However on the 25th of June, Auchinleck decided that he himself should replace Ritchie as Commander-in-Chief of the army and, fearing that the Mersa Matruh position left the army open to flanking maneuvers, declared that they would retreat further back into Egypt and take up positions near the small railway station of El Alamein for a final stand.
The retreat, however, was poorly executed and chaotic. One of the biggest challenges faced by the 8th army was the poor communication, meaning many officers were confused about what exactly they were supposed to be doing- Lt K.W Patterson, of the 33rd Anti Tank Battery, NZ Division, described the situation as “very hazy, with frequent moves and extremely scanty information”. As might be expected, this situation had a negative impact on morale. At Mersa Matruh, it nearly caused the destruction of the New Zealand Division. General Freyberg had objected to the proposed at Mersa Matruh, feeling that it was a poor defensive position. He appealed to General Ritchie and the NZ Div. was subsequently relocated to a new position at Minqar Qaim, some 25 miles south of Matrah.
In the early hours of the 27th of June, Axis troops moved to cut off the NZ position. The Italian 90th Light Infantry engaged them early in the day with artillery, shelling the NZ position, especially the command area. The New Zealand gunners fired back, despite being hampered by limited ammunition. During this artillery duel, at around 1700 hours, Freyberg went out to inspect the troops and review the situation, and his car was hit by a shell. Freyberg himself took a piece of shrapnel in the neck. Although not fatal, the wound was serious enough that Freyberg would not be fit to command for the remainder of the battle and Brigadier Lindsay Merritt Inglis acted as commanding officer for the rest of the battle. Later in the day the 21st Panzer attacked from the south east - one report estimates 20-30 tanks - that were driven off by the 25 pounders. The German and Italian troops kept up their advance, however, and by the time night fell the NZ Div. was completely surrounded.
The situation looked grim for the New Zealanders. They knew that they would be overrun the next morning unless the situation changed dramatically, their commanding officer was incapacitated and they were low on ammunition, vehicles and fuel. The decision was made to break out of the position through the lines of the 21st Panzer. The plan was risky, there were too few vehicles to carry all the men, so the soldiers were packed in "like sardines", even clinging to the sides and roof of the vehicles. The plan was for three battalions, including the Maori 28th Battalion, to break the German lines in a bayonet charge, after which the rest of the Division would follow through in their vehicles. Artillery was mounted on portees and would fire at the Germans while they sped through their lines to keep off the tanks and feared 88's. Despite the danger of the situation, Ingles' diary entry for the event simply reads: "Tonight we break out”.
At 0045 hours, the breakout began. Infantrymen fixed bayonets and charged the German trenches, overwhelming the Axis forces before they could bring their weapons to bear and stabbing them to death. Over 900 trucks and portees followed, driving 9 abreast and packed with men firing into the German lines. First hand accounts paint a picture of chaos and violence, as the Germans returned fire in thick streams of tracer. For the Germans who suffered the brunt of the New Zealand attack it was even more terrifying.
The Division kept up its mad charge through the night. Some 5 hours later, those vehicles that had made it through the breakout regrouped and set off for the El Alamein line. They had suffered some 963 casualties, but the Division would survive to fight another day.
The retreat, however, was poorly executed and chaotic. One of the biggest challenges faced by the 8th army was the poor communication, meaning many officers were confused about what exactly they were supposed to be doing- Lt K.W Patterson, of the 33rd Anti Tank Battery, NZ Division, described the situation as “very hazy, with frequent moves and extremely scanty information”. As might be expected, this situation had a negative impact on morale. At Mersa Matruh, it nearly caused the destruction of the New Zealand Division. General Freyberg had objected to the proposed at Mersa Matruh, feeling that it was a poor defensive position. He appealed to General Ritchie and the NZ Div. was subsequently relocated to a new position at Minqar Qaim, some 25 miles south of Matrah.
In the early hours of the 27th of June, Axis troops moved to cut off the NZ position. The Italian 90th Light Infantry engaged them early in the day with artillery, shelling the NZ position, especially the command area. The New Zealand gunners fired back, despite being hampered by limited ammunition. During this artillery duel, at around 1700 hours, Freyberg went out to inspect the troops and review the situation, and his car was hit by a shell. Freyberg himself took a piece of shrapnel in the neck. Although not fatal, the wound was serious enough that Freyberg would not be fit to command for the remainder of the battle and Brigadier Lindsay Merritt Inglis acted as commanding officer for the rest of the battle. Later in the day the 21st Panzer attacked from the south east - one report estimates 20-30 tanks - that were driven off by the 25 pounders. The German and Italian troops kept up their advance, however, and by the time night fell the NZ Div. was completely surrounded.
The situation looked grim for the New Zealanders. They knew that they would be overrun the next morning unless the situation changed dramatically, their commanding officer was incapacitated and they were low on ammunition, vehicles and fuel. The decision was made to break out of the position through the lines of the 21st Panzer. The plan was risky, there were too few vehicles to carry all the men, so the soldiers were packed in "like sardines", even clinging to the sides and roof of the vehicles. The plan was for three battalions, including the Maori 28th Battalion, to break the German lines in a bayonet charge, after which the rest of the Division would follow through in their vehicles. Artillery was mounted on portees and would fire at the Germans while they sped through their lines to keep off the tanks and feared 88's. Despite the danger of the situation, Ingles' diary entry for the event simply reads: "Tonight we break out”.
At 0045 hours, the breakout began. Infantrymen fixed bayonets and charged the German trenches, overwhelming the Axis forces before they could bring their weapons to bear and stabbing them to death. Over 900 trucks and portees followed, driving 9 abreast and packed with men firing into the German lines. First hand accounts paint a picture of chaos and violence, as the Germans returned fire in thick streams of tracer. For the Germans who suffered the brunt of the New Zealand attack it was even more terrifying.
The Division kept up its mad charge through the night. Some 5 hours later, those vehicles that had made it through the breakout regrouped and set off for the El Alamein line. They had suffered some 963 casualties, but the Division would survive to fight another day.