Consequences of the battle
The First Battle of El Alamein was one the most significant battle of the desert war. While the consequences of the battle are not as clear cut as its successor, the strategic impact it had on the war was nevertheless significant.
The most obvious impact of the battle was that it halted Rommel and his seemingly unstoppable Afrika Korps in their advance towards the key Egyptian cities such as Cairo and Alexandria. Had the Allies been defeated at El Alamein, either the 8th Army would have been destroyed as a fighting force, thereby damning any Allied hopes for holding the Middle East, or they would have been forced to retreat further and further into Egypt, which would have been a disaster for the morale of the troops and cost the Allies dearly, as it would have meant surrendering several key cities.
The end result of the battle was not quite what either side had aimed for. Auchinleck had failed to deal a significant defeat to the Axis force, but Rommel had not succeeded in breaking through the Allied lines or defeating the 8th Army. However, when reviewing with all the advantages of hindsight, it seems difficult to claim that the battle was a true tactical stalemate. Rommel was now bloodied and overextended, his supply lines were far longer than the Allies’ and he had lost the crucial momentum that had seemed so deadly only a month before. On the other hand, the Allies had proved they could hold their own against the ‘Desert Fox’ and now prepared to take the fight to him, which they would do on the 23rd October at the second Battle of El Alamein. Although credited to Montgomery, the Second Battle was only possible because of the success of the First. Not only were the Germans weakened, but the vast advantage in supply lines meant that the Allies could quickly build up an overwhelming numerical advantage, especially in tanks.
The cost to both armies was significant. The 8th Army had lost 13,000 men captured, wounded or killed, and many of its tanks and vehicles were destroyed or damaged. The Germans and Italians had fared little better however. Over 7000 Axis troops were taken prisoner and they too suffered devastating losses to their armoured divisions. This would prove a crucial factor in the coming Second Battle, where the Allied tank advantage helped smash the Afrika Korps and turn the tide of the campaign.
Another consequence of the battle was the changes it had on the 8th Army, most specifically the change in commanders that was a result of the battle. Auchinleck had lost all credibility with Churchill due to the loss of Tobruk and Galaza and what the Prime Minister perceived as a fondness for retreats. The Battle of El Alamein was the final straw. Although it was a tactical victory, the battle was not the flashy victory that Churchill wanted and needed after near constant defeats in Europe and Africa since the beginning of the war. Facing parliamentary and public unrest, Churchill was under pressure to produce a victory he could brag about, and El Alamein was not such a victory. Auchinleck was “given the chop” and replaced by his former subordinate Bernard Montgomery. This is in turn had several consequences: “Monty” was arguably a superior commander, and his command along with the plans laid down by Auchinleck that led to the success of the Second Battle.
New Zealand
For the New Zealand Division, the breakout at Minqar Qaim and the subsequent Battle of El Alamein were some of the most significant conflicts of the war.
Although in the context of the wider battle Minqar Qaim is often relegated to simply a part of the Mersa Matruh defeat, for New Zealand it was a pivotal action. Had the breakout at Minqar Qaim failed, the Division as it was would have been effectively destroyed, with Freyberg and other top officers taken prisoner and the vast majority of its men and vehicles captured or destroyed. Without the Division as part of his forces at El Alamein, it seems unlikely that the defensive line could have been held. Pat Kane in his book A Soldier’s Story said “it is my firm conviction that without the magnificent effort of the [4th and 5th] Brigades, the El Alamein line could not have been stabilised and Egypt would have fallen”. Despite the casualties that the they suffered during the breakout, which included some 963 men, the Division would live on the fight on several other days.
However not all of the consequences from Minqar Qaim were so positive. The battle did damage the reputation of the New Zealand troops amongst their enemies in the Axis lines. Though it may seem bizarre and antiquated to care about what the enemy believes, the Desert War was one famous for the chivalry both sides showed each other. Rommel firmly believed in showing the correct respect to prisoners of war, even directly disobeying commands to kill Jewish prisoners. The events at Minqar Qaim changed this. During the breakout, a German medical unit was overrun and the wounded German soldiers were bayoneted, as were German soldiers who were already dead or wounded. Some accounts have the Germans being decapitated and stabbed over twenty times, though it is possible these are exaggerations. The New Zealand argument was that the first Germans they had passed had merely pretended to be dead and then attacked the New Zealand troops with grenades and machine guns, and they weren’t willing to take the chance again. However Rommel decried these “gangster methods” and warned captured officer George Clifton that the Germans could and would fight dirty as well and if any similar events occurred there would be “reprisals”. The New Zealanders who were captured in the battle suffered the brunt of the German aggression over the attacks. Alan Stacy, a medical orderly, recounts tales of being made to stand in the sun for hours without water and told they were going to be shot. Eventually, however, the Germans rescinded and even Rommel came to accept that in the terror and confusion of the breakout it would have been hard to distinguish wounded soldiers from those merely sleeping or playing dead.
Of the actual battle itself, the consequences for New Zealand and the New Zealand Division were varied. During the course of the fighting the Division lost over 4000 men and the impact of this on their families, as well as the need to bring the Division back up to strength, was major.
However, for the men of the New Zealand Division it was more than just the fact that they had lost comrades and friends, it was the failure of their own allies to support them which led to those deaths. On multiple occasions the British armour failed to support the New Zealand Division, the most notable examples being at El Mreir and Ruweisat Ridge, resulting in heavy casualties. This led to a widespread distrust of British armour. Ingles wrote that “our people did their stuff, but the armour, we feel, let us down very badly on both occasions”. Freyberg resolved that the Division should have its own armoured brigade, and so the 4th Infantry Brigade, which had taken heavy casualties in the battle was converted to the 4th Armoured Brigade, which marked the first armoured brigade in New Zealand military. The 4th would go on to fight in the rest of the North African campaign and during the invasion of Italy.
The most obvious impact of the battle was that it halted Rommel and his seemingly unstoppable Afrika Korps in their advance towards the key Egyptian cities such as Cairo and Alexandria. Had the Allies been defeated at El Alamein, either the 8th Army would have been destroyed as a fighting force, thereby damning any Allied hopes for holding the Middle East, or they would have been forced to retreat further and further into Egypt, which would have been a disaster for the morale of the troops and cost the Allies dearly, as it would have meant surrendering several key cities.
The end result of the battle was not quite what either side had aimed for. Auchinleck had failed to deal a significant defeat to the Axis force, but Rommel had not succeeded in breaking through the Allied lines or defeating the 8th Army. However, when reviewing with all the advantages of hindsight, it seems difficult to claim that the battle was a true tactical stalemate. Rommel was now bloodied and overextended, his supply lines were far longer than the Allies’ and he had lost the crucial momentum that had seemed so deadly only a month before. On the other hand, the Allies had proved they could hold their own against the ‘Desert Fox’ and now prepared to take the fight to him, which they would do on the 23rd October at the second Battle of El Alamein. Although credited to Montgomery, the Second Battle was only possible because of the success of the First. Not only were the Germans weakened, but the vast advantage in supply lines meant that the Allies could quickly build up an overwhelming numerical advantage, especially in tanks.
The cost to both armies was significant. The 8th Army had lost 13,000 men captured, wounded or killed, and many of its tanks and vehicles were destroyed or damaged. The Germans and Italians had fared little better however. Over 7000 Axis troops were taken prisoner and they too suffered devastating losses to their armoured divisions. This would prove a crucial factor in the coming Second Battle, where the Allied tank advantage helped smash the Afrika Korps and turn the tide of the campaign.
Another consequence of the battle was the changes it had on the 8th Army, most specifically the change in commanders that was a result of the battle. Auchinleck had lost all credibility with Churchill due to the loss of Tobruk and Galaza and what the Prime Minister perceived as a fondness for retreats. The Battle of El Alamein was the final straw. Although it was a tactical victory, the battle was not the flashy victory that Churchill wanted and needed after near constant defeats in Europe and Africa since the beginning of the war. Facing parliamentary and public unrest, Churchill was under pressure to produce a victory he could brag about, and El Alamein was not such a victory. Auchinleck was “given the chop” and replaced by his former subordinate Bernard Montgomery. This is in turn had several consequences: “Monty” was arguably a superior commander, and his command along with the plans laid down by Auchinleck that led to the success of the Second Battle.
New Zealand
For the New Zealand Division, the breakout at Minqar Qaim and the subsequent Battle of El Alamein were some of the most significant conflicts of the war.
Although in the context of the wider battle Minqar Qaim is often relegated to simply a part of the Mersa Matruh defeat, for New Zealand it was a pivotal action. Had the breakout at Minqar Qaim failed, the Division as it was would have been effectively destroyed, with Freyberg and other top officers taken prisoner and the vast majority of its men and vehicles captured or destroyed. Without the Division as part of his forces at El Alamein, it seems unlikely that the defensive line could have been held. Pat Kane in his book A Soldier’s Story said “it is my firm conviction that without the magnificent effort of the [4th and 5th] Brigades, the El Alamein line could not have been stabilised and Egypt would have fallen”. Despite the casualties that the they suffered during the breakout, which included some 963 men, the Division would live on the fight on several other days.
However not all of the consequences from Minqar Qaim were so positive. The battle did damage the reputation of the New Zealand troops amongst their enemies in the Axis lines. Though it may seem bizarre and antiquated to care about what the enemy believes, the Desert War was one famous for the chivalry both sides showed each other. Rommel firmly believed in showing the correct respect to prisoners of war, even directly disobeying commands to kill Jewish prisoners. The events at Minqar Qaim changed this. During the breakout, a German medical unit was overrun and the wounded German soldiers were bayoneted, as were German soldiers who were already dead or wounded. Some accounts have the Germans being decapitated and stabbed over twenty times, though it is possible these are exaggerations. The New Zealand argument was that the first Germans they had passed had merely pretended to be dead and then attacked the New Zealand troops with grenades and machine guns, and they weren’t willing to take the chance again. However Rommel decried these “gangster methods” and warned captured officer George Clifton that the Germans could and would fight dirty as well and if any similar events occurred there would be “reprisals”. The New Zealanders who were captured in the battle suffered the brunt of the German aggression over the attacks. Alan Stacy, a medical orderly, recounts tales of being made to stand in the sun for hours without water and told they were going to be shot. Eventually, however, the Germans rescinded and even Rommel came to accept that in the terror and confusion of the breakout it would have been hard to distinguish wounded soldiers from those merely sleeping or playing dead.
Of the actual battle itself, the consequences for New Zealand and the New Zealand Division were varied. During the course of the fighting the Division lost over 4000 men and the impact of this on their families, as well as the need to bring the Division back up to strength, was major.
However, for the men of the New Zealand Division it was more than just the fact that they had lost comrades and friends, it was the failure of their own allies to support them which led to those deaths. On multiple occasions the British armour failed to support the New Zealand Division, the most notable examples being at El Mreir and Ruweisat Ridge, resulting in heavy casualties. This led to a widespread distrust of British armour. Ingles wrote that “our people did their stuff, but the armour, we feel, let us down very badly on both occasions”. Freyberg resolved that the Division should have its own armoured brigade, and so the 4th Infantry Brigade, which had taken heavy casualties in the battle was converted to the 4th Armoured Brigade, which marked the first armoured brigade in New Zealand military. The 4th would go on to fight in the rest of the North African campaign and during the invasion of Italy.